We study the problem faced by a monopolistic company that is dynamically pricing a perishable product or service and simultaneously learning the demand characteristics of its customers. In the learning procedure, the company observes the sales history over consecutive planning horizons and predicts consumer demand by applying an aggregating algorithm (AA) to a pool of online stochastic predictors. Numerical implementation uses finite-sample distribution approximations which are periodically updated using the most recent sales data and subsequently diversified with a random Markov step characterizing the stochastic predictors. The company's pricing policy is optimized by a simulation-based procedure integrated with AA. The methodology of this paper is general and independent of specific distributional assumptions. We illustrate this procedure on a demand model for a market where customers are aware that pricing is dynamic, may time their purchases strategically, and compete for a limited product supply. We derive the form of this demand model using a game-theoretic consumer choice model and study its structural properties. Numerical experiments demonstrate that the learning procedure is robust to deviations of the actual market response to price from the model used in learning.
Introduction
One of the fundamental challenges faced by any company is that of assessing customer response to changes in the price of the products or services it sells, and this task is particularly important for organizations that are experimenting with controlled dynamic pricing. Fortunately, frequent price changes also produce frequent opportunities for measurement of customer responses and, in principle, the possibility of obtaining near real-time estimates for customer demand models. In this paper, we develop an approach to this type of online learning of customer behavior; that is, learning that takes place as sales unfold. The approach works with a discrete-time approximation to the sales process and can be applied to learning the parameters of any demand model that produces estimates of consumer purchase probability at each time step of the approximation. We also show how learning can be integrated with pricing so that pricing policy formation and consumer demand prediction can proceed concurrently.
Our approach is based on the aggregating algorithm -a particularly general method for online learning developed by (Vovk (1990) ). To illustrate its generality, we apply it to a game-theoretic model of consumer behavior that allows for strategic consumers who know that pricing is dynamic and may time their purchases to times of anticipated lower price. The possibility of such strategic behavior has been of increasing interest recently because of the rapid growth in information available to customers through internet sales channels and 'price-shopper' web-sites. In many cases, customers are able to monitor both prices and availabilities of products over time and may develop accurate guesses about a company's future prices. Ironically, companies that employ carefully controlled dynamic pricing may be more vulnerable to strategic consumer behavior than companies employing ad hoc price adjustments since controlled dynamic pricing can lead to pricing policies with regular features; for example, monotone decreasing prices in situations where 'price-skimming' appears to be optimal.
Dynamic pricing is properly viewed as one approach to the general problem of revenue management, and there is now an extensive literature on revenue management and related practices. For surveys see Chan et al. (2004) , Bitran and Caldentey (2003) , Elmaghraby and Keskinocak (2003) , Yano and Gilbert (2003) , McGill and van Ryzin (1999) , Weatherford and Bodily (1992) , and Belobaba (1987) . Broad discussions of revenue management can be found in recent books by Talluri and van Ryzin (2004) and Phillips (2005) . Many revenue management applications depend on forecasts of consumer behavior that are generated from stochastic models of demand; for example, demand as a function of time and price.
Unfortunately, such stochastic demand-response models typically assume characteristics of demand which cannot be known precisely in practice. This uncertainty in demand characteristics has long been recognized in economics, marketing, pricing, inventory management, and revenue management, and there have been efforts to develop methods for learning of demand response functions over time. For example, Balvers and Cosimano (1990) study a pricing problem with learning of demand that is a linear function of price. The model does not consider any limits on sales due to inventory levels. Carvalho and Puterman (2005) also study learning and pricing when capacity is unlimited. The authors consider a finite time horizon and focus on specific parametric forms of the customer arrival distribution and the probability of sale (both the number of arrivals and the actual sales are observable). The parameters are assumed to be fixed and unknown. The authors explore a tradeoff between learning and pricing using a "one step look ahead" heuristic based on a two-period version of the problem. Petruzzi and Dada (2002) consider a stocking and pricing model with a fixed but unknown perturbation of some given demand function. Papers by Bertsimas and Perakis (2003) , Aviv and Pazgal (2005c) , and Lin (2006) study the pricing of a fixed stock of items over a finite horizon with demand learning. Bertsimas and Perakis (2003) consider learning of all demand characteristics including the price sensitivity, but assume a linear demand model with normal perturbations. The other two papers assume a known reservation price distribution. Aviv and Pazgal (2005b) present a general framework for dynamic pricing when stochastic properties of demand are affected by the current state of the world. The number of possible states considered by the authors is finite. They use partially observed Markov decision processes as a modeling basis and information-structure modification heuristics to provide a tractable implementation.
A recent work by Besbes and Zeevi (2006) considers a joint learning and pricing method for a network revenue management problem involving multiple products utilizing multiple resources. The approach assumes a Poisson model with demand rates determined by unknown functions of price. While the model of demand in their paper is nonparametric, the authors simplify the problem by only considering demand rates which do not depend explicitly on time (in contrast to the current paper). The policies considered involve a 'brief' period of learning (experimentation with prices selected from a grid of prices) followed by static pricing. The authors establish asymptotic optimality of the policy given that the resource capacities and the demand rates simultaneously tend to infinity.
All the learning-focused papers cited above consider restricted forms of demand models which do not consider potentially complex consumer behavior. The prior work on dynamic pricing that assumes known demand models, has allowed for varying degrees of consumer sophistication. For example, the classical models by Gallego and van Ryzin (1994) , Feng and Xiao (2000) , Zhao and Zheng (2000) , Chatwin (2000) ) assume myopic consumers who make a purchase as soon as the price is below their valuation for the product, while other models allow for strategic consumers who may benefit by delaying their purchase decisions. (see Besanko and Winston (1990) , Elmaghraby et al. (2004) , Aviv and Pazgal (2005a) , Liu and van Ryzin (2005) , Su (2005) , Levin et al. (2005) ). In the case of strategic consumers, the demand model must also capture competition between the customers if the product supply is limited.
While the case of myopic consumers is amenable to existing learning approaches, it is difficult to extend these approaches to the instances of more complex consumer behavior, in particular, strategic behavior.
Indeed, one of the typical approaches in dynamic pricing with demand uncertainty (with or without learning) is policy optimization by dynamic programming techniques, but the complexity of demand learning with strategic consumers renders an exact dynamic programming approach computationally intractable.
In our view, demand learning naturally belongs to the class of online methods. Furthermore, to ensure wide applicability in practice, an effective methodology should permit use of any distributional assumptions that a particular application requires. We develop such a methodology based on the aggregating algorithm (AA) of Vovk (1999) , which was originally developed to address the problem of combining expert advice (Vovk (1990) ). Similar techniques have been applied to the problem of online portfolio selection since the work of Cover (1991) . In our online approach, the company observes the sales history over consecutive planning horizons and applies the AA to a pool of online stochastic predictors to predict consumer demand. Numerical implementation uses finite-sample distribution approximations which are periodically updated using the most recent sales data and subsequently diversified by a random Markov step characterizing the stochastic predictors, a method applied to online portfolio selection by Levina (2004) . The company's pricing policy is optimized by a simulation-based procedure integrated with AA. We illustrate this procedure on a demand model for a market where customers are aware that pricing is dynamic, may time their purchases strategically, and compete for a limited product supply. In our strategic consumer choice model, a consumer decision is characterized as a probability of purchase at each time and state of the sales process. An aggregation of these probabilities defines the demand model. We derive the form of this demand model using a game-theoretic consumer choice model and study its structural properties under a key assumption of limited rationality of consumers with respect to the anticipated future price. We show that strategic consumer response to price is inherently dependent on time and the remaining capacity of the firm, and that this model supports an intuitively appealing decision rule for strategic consumers -that they will attempt to purchase when their consumer surplus from an immediate purchase is greater than the discounted expected surplus from all future purchasing opportunities. The expected surplus is thus identified as a key component of strategic consumer behavior. We then derive important properties for the expected surplus that can be used to construct an empirical consumer demand model. (Such an empirical approximation is needed because exact computation of the expected surplus, when combined with online learning, is not practical in problems of realistic size.) Numerical experiments demonstrate that the learning procedure is robust to discrepancies between the actual market price-response and the model of that response used in learning.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we discuss a general class of time, inventory and price-dependent demand models which includes the case of strategic consumers. In section 3, we outline a simple Bayesian approach to online learning of the parameters of the general demand model for any pricing policy. The problem of optimizing the pricing policy is addressed in subsequent sections. In section 4, we identify restricted pricing policy classes that are practical to implement and facilitate dynamic pricing with demand learning. In section 5, we integrate learning with pricing policy optimization through an online procedure utilizing the aggregating algorithm and simulation-based optimization of pricing, and we discuss our numerical experience with this procedure in the case of strategic consumers. Conclusions are provided in section 6. 2. Demand model 2.1. Sales Process. Consider a product with limited availability sold by a monopolistic company over several planning horizons, each comprising T decision periods: {0, 1, . . . , T − 1}. At time 0 in each planning horizon, the initial inventory of the product is Y, with no replenishment possible during the planning horizon. All planning horizons start with the same initial inventory. At time T, the product expires and all unsold items are lost. We assume that the company wishes to reassess its pricing decisions after each sale or offer of sale, and that the sales process unfolds in an 'orderly' fashion; that is, the company presents items for sale sequentially, one per time period. In each period t, a single sale may or may not occur. This assumption of at most one sale per decision period is a discrete approximation to the continuous-time Poisson demand model frequently assumed in revenue management literature -the probability of more than one sale in a time period becomes negligible if we consider sufficiently short time intervals. The sale probability depends on a number of variables, some of which may be unknown to the company, and its exact functional form is determined by a model of consumer behavior.
In this paper, we consider demand models in which the sale probability is a function of time t, remaining inventory level y, and the current price p.
The consumer behavior model is specified by a constant parameter vector x, which may include both known and unknown components. The existence of a parameter vector that specifies the model is implicit whenever a specific instance of a general demand model is described. For example, in the context of the classical dynamic pricing model of Gallego and van Ryzin (1994) , x would include the parameters of a model of customer arrival intensity as a function of time and parameters of the reservation price distribution. In the present paper, we expand this set to include other parameters describing consumer behavior. The only restriction is that the set of parameters is finite. The resulting sales process is then a discrete-time counting (Bernoulli) process with the sale probability given by a known function Λ x (t, y, p) of t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T − 1}, y ∈ {1, . . . , Y } and p ∈ Π, where Π is a set of admissible prices. These probabilities define the demand model.
Next we study the demand model for the markets with strategic consumers that falls into this category.
The general learning-policy optimization methodology developed in our paper will be illustrated on this demand model.
2.2.
Demand Model for the Case of Strategic Consumers. Myopic customers compare the current price with their valuation and make a purchase if their valuation exceeds the price; that is, as soon as their current consumer surplus is positive. They disregard future prices or product availability. In contrast, a strategic customer will compare the current purchasing opportunity to potential future opportunities and decide whether to purchase now or wait. A model that captures strategicity of customers must therefore specify customer beliefs about future product prices and availability. In this section, we discuss a game-theoretic consumer choice model which captures such strategic behavior and, at the same time, leads to specific forms for the purchase probability Λ x (t, y, p) which can be used by the company in the learning process. We present a set of assumptions ensuring that all of the information necessary for a customer to form his beliefs at time t is contained in the current inventory level y, price p, and, perhaps, some additional constant parameters. The assumption that customers can observe the remaining inventory is reasonable in many settings. For example, users of online travel booking web-sites can view aircraft layouts showing available seats, and many online booksellers and other retailers show the number of items remaining in stock.
The model presented here is related to the one described in Levin et al. (2005) ; however, a fundamental difference in the current paper is the assumption of limited rationality of customers -with the introduction of a learning process by the company, it is unreasonable to assume that consumers can predict the company's pricing policies. This assumption is practical and allows us to reduce the complexity of consumer behavior being modeled and to derive a number of intuitive structural results which cannot be established in general in the full rationality case. We emphasize that, like any model, the present one contains assumptions that may not hold in many real markets. However, the assumptions may hold approximately, and our main goal in presenting this detailed model is to establish a theoretical justification for the simple decision rule, mentioned in the introduction, that establishes the importance of the expected consumer surplus.
We assume that: 1) the consumer population is homogeneous and finite; 2) each customer will purchase at most one item; and 3) all customers are present in the market from the beginning of the planning horizon and remain present until they make a purchase, the company runs out of inventory, or the planning horizon ends. By homogeneity of the population we do not mean that all consumers act identically in a given decision period; instead, diversity of consumer actions is achieved by defining homogeneity in a stochastic sense as described in more detail below. The assumption of a finite population is appropriate for modeling strategic consumers since, in this setting, it is necessary to describe individual consumer behavior. Consumer presence from the beginning of the planning horizon represents a marketplace in which each consumer engages in strategic planning and can make a purchase at any time during the selling season. This assumption can be relaxed by incorporating random consumer departures and arrivals (up to some maximum population size). However, such a generalization complicates the analysis and is not crucial for an initial presentation of the methodology. We let I be the set of customers, and N its initial size.
The assumption of homogeneity of the consumer population has some important consequences. First, it reduces information requirements for computing the optimal strategy. If the population is nonhomogeneous, then consumers and the company would need to track the dynamics of the population distribution over nonhomogeneous characteristics. We show that, with a homogeneous population, it is sufficient to track only the current number of customers, n, who have not yet acquired an item. In practical terms, the knowledge of the number of customers present is appropriate in electronic markets requiring registration or, approximately, when web-sites track and report the number of unique 'hits' to their site. A company has an incentive to report the total market size to its customers to reinforce the perception of competition. Second, homogeneity justifies an assumption that each customer believes that other customers behave stochastically in the same way.
Stochastic aspects of the model aim at capturing consumer uncertainty: about future prices, about future willingness to pay, and about timing of purchases. Timing uncertainty also encompasses acquisition uncertainty since customers cannot be sure that they will acquire the product if supply is limited -a phenomenon frequently occurring in practice.
Next, we summarize elements of the consumer choice model which are similar to those in Levin et al. (2005) .
(1) Each customer has a budget: the maximum amount he/she is willing to spend on the company's product in the current decision period. A customer with a budget value b who makes a purchase at price p, evaluates it in terms of the surplus b−p. The value of the surplus for an item purchased in the future is discounted by a factor β ∈ [0, 1] per time period, which can be interpreted as the degree of strategicity of the customer. There is no penalty for failure to acquire an item other than opportunity loss.
(2) The budgets at time t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T − 1} are random variables B i (t), i ∈ I. Budgets of different customers are exchangeable, reflecting stochastic homogeneity of the consumer population.
Exchangeability implies that that budgets B i (t), i ∈ I of different customers are identically distributed with a common distribution function F t (b).
(3) The collections {B i (t), i ∈ I}, for different t are independent. This assumption reflects a rather extreme version of volatile customer behavior -a customer eager to purchase in one period may fail to be eager in the next -however, it also nicely captures consumer uncertainty about future willingness to pay for the product and is best understood together with Assumption 5, below, relating to uncertain purchase timing.
(4) At the time of their decisions, all customers know the current number of customers n, the remaining inventory y, current price p, and their own budget realizations b i (t) (but not the budget realizations of other customers).
(5) A customer who is eager to purchase in a specific period will succeed only with a certain probability, thus the exact timing of the customer's purchase is uncertain. The expected number of purchasing opportunities for a particular customer during all T decision periods combined is given byλT , whereλ is the probability that an eager customer will actually be able to acquire an item in a given period. The probability that a sale to some customer occurs is the sum of the probabilities of sales to individual customers. For example, in the case of k customers trying to purchase an item, the probability of a sale occurring is kλ. This assumption makes budget independence for different times more credible, since it is the budget at an (uncertain) time of a future purchase opportunity that really matters to the customer, a quantity that may well be unrelated to the current budget value.
(6) A customer decision at time t for a given inventory level y, number of remaining customers n, price p and budget level b, is their purchase probability λ x (t, n, y, p, b) ∈ [0,λ]. (Note that, since customers know the size of the customer population, the number of remaining customers can be computed from the current inventory level as n = N − (Y − y)). The decisions will be shown to be identical for all customers with the same realized budgets b because of population homogeneity. The superscript x emphasizes the obvious dependence of customer decisions on the model parameters in x. The probabilistic nature of customer decisions leads to a random allocation mechanism that distributes a potentially limited supply of items between competing customers.
(7) Customer response to a pricing policy is determined by a stochastic dynamic game among the customers. A round of the game at time t, given y and n, proceeds as follows: customers observe the price p and their (private) budget values b i (t), i = 1, . . . , n and simultaneously respond by their eagerness to buy an item at this time (the eagerness is a value between 0 and 1, with 1 signifying a desire to acquire an item immediately, and 0 signifying an absence of desire).
We assume that the probability of purchase λ x (t, n, y, p, b) by the customer in the current time interval is proportional to the customer's eagerness to buy, and the coefficient of proportionality isλ.
In general, consumer's purchasing decisions will depend not only on the structure of the market, but also on how they form their expectations concerning the future pricing of the company. Under assumptions of perfect information and full rationality of all market participants (see Levin et al. (2005) ), customers expect a future pricing policy to be optimal from the company's point of view. The resulting pricing model is then determined by subgame-perfect equilibrium in a stochastic dynamic game between the company and the customers. However, in a learning situation where the information is imperfect and customers do not know the learning mechanism used by the company, it is unrealistic to expect that the customers are able to compute the future pricing policy. Therefore, we assume that customers' rationality is limited, and they treat the future price realizations as random values (moves of nature) rather than as values strategically selected by a rational player (the company). Specifically, we assume that they use a common anticipated price processp(t) which is a Markov process on Π with finite expectation for all t. The initial value of this Markov process at time t is the last price seen by the customers. That is, if the company uses price p at time t, the distribution of prices anticipated by the customers at time t + 1 is that of [p(t + 1) |p(t) = p]. The same model of consumer anticipations with respect to future prices was used, for example, by Assuncao and Meyer (1993) . The customers still treat each other as rational participants in the resulting stochastic dynamic game. There are several simple models which satisfy the Markovian assumption. For example, thep(t)'s can be independent for different t. Alternatively, when the set of feasible prices Π is discrete, we can assume (as we do in benchmark numerical examples to follow) thatp(t) is a random walk with probability q of moving to the next higher value in Π, probability r of moving to the next lower value in Π, and probability 1 − q − r of staying at the same value. Once the walk reaches an extreme value in Π, it can only stay constant or move to interior values; that is, it will stay constant with probability 1 − r if it is at a maximum or probability 1 − q at a minimum. This model of beliefs about prices assumes customer knowledge of the set Π. If Π is a continuous set, the assumed knowledge of possible prices is simply the minimum and maximum of an interval. In the case of discrete prices, customers can often guess likely prices.
For example, it is quite common in retail sales to use prices of the form $99, $109, $119, $129,... or discounts of the form 5%, 10%, 15%,..., and consumers are well aware of this.
The potential unknowns to the company which determine customer response to prices are the maximum shopping probabilityλ, the customer discount factor β, the distribution of B(t) at each time t, F t (·), and the set of parameters which determine the behavior of the anticipated price processp(t) (for example, the random walk transition probabilities q, r, or distribution parameters for the independent p(t)'s case). If the distribution of B(t) is parametric (determined by a finite number of parameters), we can include all of this information in the parameter vector x.
In section 2.3, below, we describe how this model, for a known x, predicts customer response (purchase probability) for given y, n, p, b at time t. A key insight from this analysis is the importance of the consumer's expected surplus corresponding to a given state of the process.
While we assume that customers' behavior is consistent with knowledge of the vector x, the company will typically not have information about at least some of its components. However, the company may possess prior estimates for some of these parameters through, for example, consumer surveys. Such estimates can be introduced naturally to the learning process as part of a prior distribution for x. When x is completely unknown, the response can be predicted from estimates of the distribution of x starting from an arbitrary prior distribution (e.g. uniform) and proceeding with updates as the sales process unfolds. We will show that it is not always necessary to formulate demand learning in terms of the detailed parameters of the consumer choice model but, rather, with an empirical model which approximates consumer response through the expected surplus. We defer the discussion of such empirical models and the development of a learning process until after the structural results of the next section have been developed.
Properties of Solutions
Determined by the Consumer Choice Model. Let S x (t, y, n, p) denote the equilibrium expected present value of the customer surplus at time t given the knowledge of y, n and the price p used by the company in the previous decision period and before the current period's price and budget values are observed. The following proposition describes a recursion for calculating the equilibrium customer surplus and the resulting shopping probability. We provide proofs of this and the other propositions in this section in the Online Appendix.
Proposition 1. Suppose that E[|B(t)|] and E[|p(t)|]
are finite for given parameter values x. Then a subgame-perfect equilibrium in the game between the customers exists. The expected payoffs of all customers in information states at time t before experiencing budget and price values at time t and given the observed price at time t − 1 are identical and uniquely determined by recursion
with the terminal conditions
The corresponding equilibrium strategies (identical for all customers) are given by
where I[·] is an indicator function.
The interpretation of this result is clear: a customer will purchase with the maximum possible probabilityλ whenever the budget/price difference is greater than or equal to the discounted expected surplus for purchasing an item in the future. Note that (4) generalizes the model with myopic consumers (β = 0), who attempt a purchase whenever b − p ≥ 0, to the case of general β by means of the correction term βS x (t + 1, y, n, p).
The corollary stated next is important for application of the consumer choice model to the pricing problem of the company. The corollary follows directly from (4) by summing expected purchase probabilities of all remaining customers, and using the fact that the expectation of an indicator function of an event is equal to the event's probability:
Corollary 1. Assuming that the customers behave according to their equilibrium strategies, the purchase probability Λ x (t, y, p) can be computed as
where P x (·) denotes the probability given parameter values x.
The above corollary shows that, under certain simplifying assumptions, the probability of sale in a given decision period is a function of time, inventory level and the announced price. Moreover, the corollary describes the structure of this functional dependence. While Corollary 1 offers a useful insight, this structure needs further study. One of the issues is dependence of Λ x (t, y, p) on price p. In the model with myopic customers, which is obtained by taking
a non-increasing function of p. While this is expected to be true in demand models for most (non-Giffin) goods, the non-increasing property is not immediately obvious in our model for general β. Thus, we need to analyze the expected surplus S x (t + 1, y, n, p) resulting from a subgame-perfect equilibrium in the stochastic dynamic game between customers who assume that the future price follows an exogenous Markov processp(t). In the discussion to follow, we consider general values of y and n, not necessarily those appearing in a realization of a sales process starting with fixed Y and N .
The following proposition can be interpreted as follows: at any time t, the expected customer surplus is smaller when a sale has just occurred than when it has not, since customer competition for remaining items increases after a sale occurs.
Proposition 2. For all t, y, n, p, we have
The next proposition shows that the surplus is a non-increasing function in the number of customers.
Again, this result is natural since competition increases for the same inventory when the number of customers is larger:
Proposition 3. For all t, y, n, p, we have S x (t, y, n, p) ≤ S x (t, y, n − 1, p).
Propositions 2 and 3 immediately imply that, for a fixed population of customers, the surplus is a non-decreasing function of the remaining inventory y (also natural since smaller inventory for the same number of customers creates higher competition):
Corollary 2. For all t, y, n, p, we have S x (t, y − 1, n, p) ≤ S x (t, y, n, p).
The next proposition provides a useful bound on the difference in expected customer surpluses corresponding to different observed prices and leads directly to a proof of monotonicity of purchase probability with respect to price. The formulation uses the following notion of stochastic order (see, for example Shaked and Shanthikumar (1994) ): a random variable X is said to be stochastically smaller
provided that expectations exist. The bounding relation is defined in terms of a sequence of constants
The sequence is decreasing in t and has the property that 0 ≤ κ t <κ, wherē
Proposition 4. Suppose that for all t > 0 and p, p ∈ Π such that p < p , the anticipated future price
with probability 1. Then, for all t, y, n and p, p ∈ Π such that p < p , we have
Since κ t < 1, the absolute difference in discounted surpluses corresponding to two different prices is smaller than the difference in these prices. Then, as long as the stochastic order assumption is satisfied, the following important corollary establishing monotonicity of Λ x (t, y, p) in p holds:
Corollary 3. Under the assumptions of the above proposition, for all t, y, n and p, p ∈ Π such that p < p , we have
The latter inequality is strict if P x (p + βS x (t, y, n, p) ≤ B(t) < p + βS x (t, y, n, p )) > 0.
The assumptions of Proposition 4 concerning stochastic properties ofp(t) are reasonable restrictions on the customer perception of the policy and can be interpreted as follows:
] since a customer assumes that the future price tends to be higher if the past price is higher. Also, when
with probability 1 since a customer expects the difference in the future and past prices to be lower when the past price is higher. These assumptions are satisfied both wheñ p(t) is a random walk on equally spaced prices (see the Online Appendix for details), and whenp(t) is independent ofp(t − 1).
The next result shows that the surplus is a non-increasing function of time when the budget distribution is stationary over time. This result is natural since shorter remaining time implies fewer purchase opportunities for the customers.
Proposition 5. Suppose that for all t and p ∈ Π, the distributions of the budget B(t) and the anticipated future price [p(t + 1) |p(t) = p] are independent of t (stationary). Then, for all t, y, n and p ∈ Π, we have S x (t, y, n, p) ≥ S x (t + 1, y, n, p).
We point out that it is not necessary to accept all of the assumptions of the consumer choice model described above. Instead, one can assume that the simple decision rule given by (4) is a plausible approximation to the behavior of risk-neutral consumers and that the structural results given above are reasonable assumptions about the properties of the expected surplus.
Empirical Model for the Discounted Expected Surplus.
When the assumptions underlying the consumer choice model hold, we can view a company's learning process as a gradual improvement of knowledge of all unknown model parameters in x. This corresponds to learningλ, β, F t (·) for each time t, and the set of parameters which determine the behavior of the anticipated price processp(t).While this may be possible in principle, it is unlikely to be computationally feasible in practice with problems of realistic size; thus, approximations are required.
One obvious approximation is to replace the freely time-varying budget distributions F t (·) with a constant distribution F (·), or introduce a model for the time-variation. In our numerical experiments, we use the constant distribution approximation. Now note that, aside from the budget distribution, the customer purchase probability given by (1) only requires knowledge of the adjustment term βS x (t + 1, y, n, p). We can replace learning of the remaining parameters in x with simply learning the parameters of an approximation to this adjustment term. We will call such an approximation an empirical model for strategic consumers. In selecting the form of an empirical model, it is important to understand typical characteristics of βS x (t + 1, y, n, p) as a function of t, y, n, p. The structural results derived above provide some guidance in selecting the empirical model. Numerical examination of typical behavior of S x (t + 1, y, n, p) resulting from the consumer choice model can also assist in selection. We defer presentation of a possible empirical model to the numerical experiments section 5.1 below.
Learning from sales
In this section, we assume only that the company has a purchase probability model Λ x (t, y, p) that describes collective consumer behavior, and we focus on the problem of learning the parameters x under any pricing policy as a necessary first step towards optimizing the pricing policy. A specific instance of a demand model in this class was discussed in section 2, where we are able to obtain Λ x (t, y, p) in the form (5). We consider demand learning on the basis of sales only, although exogenous information such as the results of consumer surveys can be introduced as part of a prior distribution for x. If x is known exactly, the company can predict customer response to a pricing policy since the probability of sale Λ x (t, y, p) then becomes a function of t, y, and p only. Also, since all essential features of consumer behavior are reflected in the form of Λ x (t, y, p), by learning the value of x, the company can correctly account for customer behavior in the policy optimization process to be described in the next section.
Assume that initial knowledge about the parameter vector x is contained in a prior distribution, which is continuous and specified by a given density function. As additional sales information becomes available, the distribution reflecting the company's knowledge about x is updated to a posterior distribution which is also continuous. At the beginning of decision period t, complete histories of the sales and price processes from previous decision periods are available. We define:
• N t as the set of decision periods during which a sale was made, and
• P t = {p 0 , . . . , p t−1 } as the list of all prices used previously.
At time t, the list P t has length t, and the set N t has cardinality Y − y, where y is the current level of inventory. We denote the random vector distributed according to the prior density as x(∅, ∅).
The parameter vector distributed according to the posterior density at time t corresponding to histories N t , P t is x(N t , P t ). The posterior density at x is obtained (up to a normalizing constant) by multiplying the prior density at x and the likelihood of the observed sales history for a particular parameter value x. In the likelihood expression, we use the auxiliary notation:
• y τ = Y − |N τ | is the number of units left at the beginning of decision period τ (note that for
and
• N t = {0, . . . , t − 1} \ N t is the set of decision periods during which no sale was made.
The likelihood function at the beginning of decision period t is given by
Based on the observed histories and using the posterior distribution, the company can estimate the probability of future sales as a function of price paths. For example, the probability of a sale occurring in decision period t is
where p is the price set by the company. In some models of consumer behavior, it may be possible to reduce the dependence of the estimated probability (12) on histories to certain sufficient statistics by using conjugate families of distributions. However, it is unlikely that reasonable conjugate families exist in the general case (and even in the specific case of strategic consumers). Thus, we will instead keep our methodology free from specific distributional assumptions and approximate the prior and posterior distributions in their most general form.
Before providing a description of the integration of this learning process with policy optimization through an aggregating algorithm we discuss policy class restrictions.
Implementable pricing strategies: policy class restriction
The company's objective is to maximize its expected revenues by selecting an optimal pricing policy from an appropriate class. If the value of x is known, the probability of sale Λ x (t, y, p) is a function of t, y, and p only, the state of the system at each time t can be described by the current inventory level y, and one can solve the problem using dynamic programming with pricing policies of the form p = p(t, y). If even a single component of the parameter vector x is unknown, a state description of the form (t, y) is inadequate. Indeed, any control problem with unknown parameters belongs to a class of problems with imperfect information well known for their difficulty. In the present case, the difficulty arises because, not only the time t and the current inventory level Y − |N t |, but the entire history affects the probability of a sale given in (12). Consequently, the optimal price will also depend on the histories; that is, p = p(N t , P t ). Obtaining an optimal policy of this form, even for a moderately-sized problem, is computationally intractable (at least in the general case) due to the size of the state space.
On the other hand, for known x, the optimal policy is of the form p = p(t, y). This motivates us to consider policies in the class p = p(t, y), while assuming that the company would like to maximize total expected revenues until the end of each planning horizon, with expectation taken both over all possible sales paths and the most recent parameter distribution update. Policies of the form p = p(t, y)
are common in the dynamic pricing literature since Gallego and van Ryzin (1994) . Note that under this policy structure, the price path P t can always be computed from the sales path N t since:
Denote the price path and the revenues corresponding to the sales history N t and policy p(·) as
respectively, and the set of all sales histories N t corresponding to either a sold out condition |N t | = Y or the end of horizon condition t = T as N ∆ . Then, maximization of total expected revenues can be expressed as (14) max
The inner sum in (14) corresponds to taking expectation over all possible sample paths conditional on the value of the parameter vector. The exact (either numerical or analytic) computation of this objective is difficult in most situations. We remark, however, that such an objective is amenable to an approximate computation through simulation. Moreover, for each fixed pricing policy, the simulation procedure is straightforward, and can be accomplished by drawing a sufficiently large number of samples as follows:
(i) simulate a parameter vector from x(∅, ∅), and
(ii) conditional on the value of the sampled parameter vector, simulate a sales path using Λ x (t, y, p)
as probabilities of sale.
The objective is then computed as the sample average of revenues corresponding to all simulated sample paths. The average over repetitions of Step (i) corresponds to taking the outer expectation in (14), and the average over step (ii) evaluates the inner sum in (14).
If decision variables are continuous (that is, in our case, if Π is continuous), the objective functions approximated by simulation can be numerically optimized by general derivative-free methods. These optimization methods can handle problems with a small number of variables and noisy objective functions whose derivatives are not available (for example, the DFO algorithm is an implementation of a method of this type, see Conn et al. (1997a,b) ). Subclasses of policies that can be described by only a few variables are, for example:
(1) an open-loop policy for which price depends on time only and remains fixed on each of m prespecified partitions of {0, 1, . . . , T − 1} (this policy is described by m variables);
(2) an open-loop, single threshold policy for which the price at time t additionally depends on whether the inventory y exceeds a fixed threshold y * (described by 2m variables);
(3) a single threshold linear policy whose variables are coefficients of two linear functions of time p 1 (t) = v 1 + w 1 t and p 2 (t) = v 2 + w 2 t, such that the price is p 1 (t) if y ≥ y * and p 2 (t), otherwise (described by 4 variables);
(4) a single ratio threshold linear policy which is similar to the previous one except for a threshold of the ratio form y/(T − t) ≥ ρ for some fixed ρ ≥ 0.
In numerical experiments provided later, we confine ourselves to policies in these classes.
Integrated learning and pricing policy optimization
In many settings, it is possible to construct a learning system using the general approach of reinforcement learning, (see, for example Sutton and Barto (1998) ) -a methodology closely related to Markov decision processes and focused on estimation of a value function. However, reinforcement learning methods typically depend on the assumption that the 'environment' is time-stationary. In the case of dynamic pricing, the key component of the environment is consumer demand and, since demand models considered by us are inherently non-stationary within each planning horizon, an application of valuefunction-based reinforcement learning techniques becomes particularly difficult. Generally, any method based on directly learning the optimal pricing policy is likely to be inappropriate for a dynamic pricing problem with unknown demand model if consumer response to a policy is time and state dependent, since it takes the whole planning horizon to collect the sales data needed to evaluate the performance of a single pricing policy. Moreover, after observing the effects of a given policy, it is impossible to know the performance of other policies until new sales data are collected.
On the other hand, a prediction approach does not pose the same difficulty, since it is possible to form alternative predictions of the customer response to a given pricing policy and to simultaneously evaluate how they match the observed data. Therefore, we choose to formulate learning in terms of improving predictions of customer response to selected pricing policies. Policy selection then becomes a separate task which has to be integrated with learning while, preferably, taking the uncertainty of predictions into account. This task is naturally accomplished by a simulation-based optimization of the policy as described in section 4, and better predictions will generally lead to pricing policies that are closer to the optimum.
To address the prediction problem, we note that predicting consumer response is reduced, by an appropriate demand model, to estimating the parameter vector x that uniquely specifies this model.
The uncertainty in prediction and the current state of knowledge of x is represented by a posterior distribution for x, and learning the parameters consists in updating this posterior distribution as sales and price information becomes available. We refer to the time between such updates as a learning stage. In the absence of specific distributional assumptions, learning through updating the posterior distribution has to be handled numerically using finite sample approximations. These techniques are computationally intensive and often become intractable as the volume of collected data grows.
To arrive at a practical procedure, we use our experience with the aggregating algorithm (AA) of Vovk (1999) (see also Levina (2006) ). Here, we give a brief overview of the AA to establish terminology. In the most abstract terms, the methodology of AA hinges upon the notion of an elementary predictorany method that produces a prediction in every learning stage. The concept of an elementary predictor is very general; for example, it can include human 'expert' opinion, a conventional forecasting technique like regression, or the realizations of an arbitrary stochastic process (with the value in each learning stage being the prediction). The key is that elementary predictors produce sequences of predictions over time. A pool of predictors is a given collection of such methods, and AA is a general approach for aggregating predictions from a pool into a single prediction in a given learning stage. Each elementary predictor in the pool has a weight which reflects its past performance. After predictions are made, the outcomes of reality are observed, and each predictor's weight is updated by multiplying it with a nonnegative factor reflecting its current performance. The aggregation is often accomplished with a weighted average of predictions using the updated weights, but other aggregation methods are possible.
We specialize the general aggregating algorithm to our problem by identifying predictions with possible values of the vector x (since values for x lead directly to predictions of collective consumer behavior through the sale probability Λ x (t, y, p)). We consider elementary predictors that change their predic- is determined only by the value of the most recent distribution of predictions. We choose the factor for the weight update of a predictor making prediction x to be the likelihood, given x, of sales data accumulated since the last update. This choice, together with the Markovian structure, implies that the combined weight of all elementary predictors producing prediction x is an approximation to the posterior density at x corresponding to observed sales data. If changes in predictions from one learning stage to the next are, on average, small (the magnitude of the random walk step is small), then the level of 'noise' introduced into the approximation is also small. On the other hand, the magnitude of the step should be sufficiently large to ensure robustness of learning and provide for faster exploration of parameter space. Since the resulting pool of predictors is infinite, and its dimension expands with the number of updates, maintaining the weights of predictors in the pool and, moreover, aggregation are based on a finite-sample approximation. Specifically, the combined weight of all elementary predictors that deliver predictions in a particular area of the parameter space is approximated by the proportion of a finite sample of predictions that fall in that area. The weight update is handled with an accept-reject procedure (described in the appendix) that ensures that predictions with greater likelihood are sampled with proportionally higher probability. Following the update of the sample, the change in predictions from one learning stage to the next is effected by a step of the Markov predictor process starting from the points of the updated sample. Finally, the sample of predictions is passed to the an optimization procedure, which replaces a direct aggregation of predictions by policy optimization; that is, the various sample predictions are 'averaged' through their contributions to simulation-based calculation of a new optimal pricing policy.
We next provide some details of the resulting numerical procedure which includes three components:
simulation-based pricing policy optimization, finite-sample posterior distribution approximation update, and sample modification by a random Markov step. Additional implementation information is provided in the appendix.
Learning can proceed both in online mode (after every decision period) and in offline mode (between consecutive planning horizons). Moreover, since a fully online mode may suffer from excessive computational overhead, we consider intermediate situations in which learning occurs multiple times per planning horizon but not as frequently as every decision period. In any case, the pricing policy is recomputed after each update of the posterior distribution. When the policy is recomputed at an intermediate point t of the planning horizon, the objective function (14) has to be modified by taking into account the expected revenues over [t , T ] only, and replacing the prior distribution x(∅, ∅) with the posteriorx = x(N t , P t (p (·), N t )) corresponding to the observed histories N t , P t (p (·), N t ) obtained under the previous policy. The modified objective is to maximize future expected revenues (15) max
where R(p (·), N t ) represents past revenues (a constant),
represents the portion of the likelihood corresponding to the future segment of the sales and price process histories, and p(·) is a future pricing policy (coinciding with p (·) up to time t ).
Since an analytic calculation of the objective (15) is impossible in general, we use numerical approximation via Monte-Carlo integration over the most recent posterior density and the future sales process paths. The two-step simulation approach to objective evaluation has been outlined in section 4.
In that procedure, the first step involves sampling parameter vectors. In the integrated learning and policy evaluation procedure, this sample is already available as the sample representing the most recent distribution of predictions. It is only necessary to simulate the sample paths using a given pricing policy and the probabilities of sale corresponding to sample elements.
The second component of the integrated learning-optimization procedure, the finite-sample posterior distribution approximation update which corresponds to the update in weights, is handled by an acceptreject algorithm with bootstrap re-sampling. While the algorithm constructs are rather standard, its bootstrapping feature results in potentially many duplicates in the updated sample. The third component, sample modification, directly addresses this drawback by breaking up ties between different sample points. In the absence of such a modification, after just a few distribution updates, the approximation becomes too coarse. A reasonable choice for the elementary predictors of the Markov switching type are realizations of Gaussian random walks with a step of mean zero. The standard deviation parameter of the step can be used to adjust the average magnitude of the step. To make the method more robust to changes in environment, we also allow occasional 'restarts' -a small (random) number of vectors in the new sample are sampled from a prior distribution rather than from a random walk around the value from the old sample.
The resulting learning procedure can also be viewed from a genetic algorithm perspective. The sample represents a population of parameter vectors. The fitness of each parameter vector is the likelihood of the observed sales and price history given this parameter vector. The number of offspring of the vector in the new sample is proportional to its fitness. Each offspring also undergoes a mutation. This mutation is usually small (Gaussian random walk), but sometimes a strong deviation from the parent point appears (reset to a prior distribution). This achieves diversity in the sample and an appropriate trade off between exploitation of previous good values and exploration of new ones.
An entire learning process unfolds as follows. We fix the maximum number of decision periods in a single learning stage: a number θ between 1 and T (periodicity). With periodicity of 1, distribution updates occur after every time step (online), while, with periodicity of T , they occur after the completion of a sales season (offline). A distribution update also occurs at the end of the planning horizon or if all items are sold out. The process begins with an initial sample from the prior distribution. Then, for each time horizon, the process:
(1) recomputes the pricing policy until the end of the current horizon using a simulation-based optimization of the objective in (15), (2) observes the sales for up to θ decision periods, or until the end of horizon is reached, or all items are sold, (3) updates the finite-sample approximation to the posterior parameter distribution using acceptreject bootstrap re-sampling, (4) modifies the parameter sample using a random Markov step (random walk or, with a given probability, a reset to the prior distribution), (5) if the end of horizon is reached, or all items are sold, moves to the next time horizon, and (6) returns to step 1.
Next we report our numerical experience with this integrated learning-optimization procedure. We specify the demand models used in subsection 5.1 and report the results of computer simulations of the learning process in subsection 5.2. 5.1. Numerical illustration of consumer choice-based and empirical demand models. In the demand model (5) for the case of strategic consumers, the most crucial component is the expected surplus S x (t, y, N − (Y − y), p) and its dependence on time t, remaining inventory y and price p. Based on the structural results of section 2, we may expect the surplus to be a decreasing function of t and an increasing function of y. Although this has not been proved as a structural result, we may expect from standard "decreasing marginal return" considerations, that the expected surplus will typically be concave in t and y. In addition, if the future prices anticipated by the customers increase monotonically in the last price observed by them, then it is reasonable to expect that the expected surplus is decreasing in prices, and even drops to nearly zero when the price is high enough.
All these dependencies are indeed present in the following numerical illustration of the expected surplus resulting from a consumer choice model described by the following combination of parameters:
the initial inventory Y = 20, the initial number of customers N = 30, the planning horizon T = 200, λT = 4, β = 1, the budget distribution Normal(4, 2), a discrete set of 50 prices {0.2, 0.4, . . . , 10}, and a random walk with q = r = 0.05 on this price set as an anticipated price process model. linear increasing as a function of inventory, and tail negative exponential as a function of time. This, together with properties outlined in the beginning of this subsection, motivates the following empirical model to approximate the discounted expected surplus term in the purchase probability model 5:
This model approximates the effects of many of the parameters in the detailed consumer choice model; namely, β, and the set of parameters for the anticipated price processp(t). Estimation of the parameter vector x is thereby simplified to estimation of the four parameters a, b, c, d in the empirical model plus the parameters of the budget distributions B(t). The true budget distribution is Normal(4, 2). The pricing policy of the company is in the single threshold linear class with a threshold at 50. Figure 1 shows each respective planning horizon's total revenue as a fraction of the optimal expected revenues for the actual customer behavior model (computed by the standard dynamic programming approach). The results are averaged over 10 replications. We see that the performance of an informed company quickly starts to dominate the performance of an uninformed company. Overall, the average performance for the informed scenario is 98.2% of the optimal expected revenue, and the performance for the uninformed scenario is 96.4%.
In the second experiment, we examine the effect of learning periodicity on the algorithm's perfor- an open-loop policy does not depend on the inventory level explicitly, its recalculation after a distribution update allows the company to incorporate a limited form of state feedback. Table 1 presents the average of the observed revenues in all planning horizons and all replications as a fraction of the optimal expected revenues for the true model together with the standard deviation of the average of this fraction per replication. We see that decreasing periodicity (that is, making learning more frequent), significantly increases the average performance for the informed scenario to the point that it approaches 99%. On the other hand, under the uninformed scenario, the gap in performance (of about 5% and 3%
of the optimum for TL10 and OL5 policies, respectively) persists and does not close with increasing periodicity of learning. This illustrates the importance of having an appropriate (even if not absolutely accurate) model of consumer demand in the online learning framework.
While the gap of 2-4% between the informed and uninformed scenarios is significant, it is interesting to know what factors may affect it, and whether it can be larger. As we have already pointed out, a marketplace with strategic consumers results in a nonstationary and state-dependent demand intensity.
Our model reflects this in the time and state dependent form of the expected surplus which is completely ignored by an uninformed company. The expected consumer surplus starts at some large value in the beginning of the planning horizon and subsequently drops to zero at the end. Charging the same price will result in larger demand at the end of the horizon as compared to the beginning of the horizon.
Thus, one may expect the performance gap to be larger when the maximum value of the surplus at the typical price levels is larger. The two factors which may significantly affect the maximum surplus are the uncertainty of the future budget relative to its constant part (represented by the coefficient of variation CV = σ/µ) and the availability of the product. Note that the constant part of the budget distribution is typically incorporated in the overall price and is not likely to affect the maximum surplus Table 2 . In this experiment,
we focus on the long-term performance and exclude the first time horizon in every replication. The results confirm our intuition. The performance gap between two scenarios increases with an increase in the relative uncertainty in the budget and the initial inventory. We also note that the standard deviation of the performance ratio increases with the relative uncertainty in the budget. This is natural since demand becomes less predictable when the uncertainty in the budget is higher. The most difficult situation is Y = 30 and the budget mean of 2 for either scenario. However, the uncertainty of results and performance deterioration is particularly high for an uninformed company. It is also interesting to note that more frequent learning leads to deterioration of performance in the uninformed case. This is most likely due to a phenomenon of "overfitting" of the myopic model to the sales data during a particular segment of the planning horizon. The myopic model fitted, for example, in the beginning of the planning horizon will be inadequate for prediction at the end of the planning horizon.
The next experiment examines the sensitivity of performance of the learning procedure to the parameters of the predictors. Specifically, we examine whether the restart of the predictor to a vector drawn from the prior distribution adds any value, and what are the effects of the magnitude of the switching step. The overall setup is similar to the previous experiment but we only examine a budget mean of 2 (CV = 1) and an inventory level Y = 20. In addition to the informed and uninformed scenarios and periodicities of 40 and 200, we examine: the setup with no restarts, and two setups with restarts where the magnitude of the switching step was on the average 5 times higher and 5 times lower than in the previous experiment. The results are presented in Table 3 . Comparing these results to lines 3-4 in Table 2 , we see that the absence of restarts can make the method less robust, especially in the The overall winner appears to be TL5. We also see that the performance gap between two scenarios persists across all policy types.
In all of the above experiments, we see that an informed company, even one using an approximate empirical model, has a significant advantage over an uninformed one. As an additional robustness test, we examine what happens if the customers update their perception of the pricing policy from one planning horizon to the next. This somewhat relaxes the assumption of the constant parameter vector x. Specifically, the parameters q, r of the anticipated price process (initially equal to 0.05) are perturbed from one planning horizon to the next using a Normal(0, 0.02) random step truncated so that the resulting values satisfy q, r ≥ 0 and q + r ≤ 1. This random perturbation in parameters results in approximately 4% variability in the optimal expected revenues between consecutive planning horizons. The results of the experiment using the OL5 policy and keeping all other options the same as in the experiment examining the effects of the policy choice are presented in Table 5 . We do not see deterioration in performance in the informed case while the gap between the informed and uninformed scenarios increases. This shows that the learning procedure is sufficiently flexible to handle moderate random changes occurring in the marketplace.
Conclusions
This paper presents a new procedure for dynamic pricing by a monopolistic company that is selling a perishable product or service and simultaneously learning the demand characteristics of its customers.
The paper makes two contributions. First, we develop an adaptive procedure that permits learning of consumer response through observation of sales over successive planning horizons. We learn the characteristics of demand by means of an aggregating algorithm, and the pricing policy is optimized by a simulation-based procedure. Both procedures are integrated into a single computational technique. The methodology of this paper is general and independent of specific distributional assumptions. Second, we illustrate the proposed learning methodology in the case of strategic consumers. To make this case amenable to learning, we develop a game-theoretic limited-rationality consumer choice model that describes how strategic customers respond to a pricing policy, and study its structural properties.
Finally, the proposed learning approach is robust in a statistical sense since the observed performance is very close to the optimal despite the use of an approximate model of consumer behavior. The first component of the integrated policy optimization-learning approach in simulation-based policy optimization step. While the optimization algorithm is a general derivative-free method, we need to implement a subroutine that evaluates the objective function by simulation. Let the most recent distribution of the parameter vectorx be approximated by a discrete sample W = {x i } K i=1 . In the terminology of AA, each element of W corresponds to a prediction of consumer demand by a particular predictor. The second step is, for each x i , to simulate M i realizations of the future sales process sample path using the pricing policy and Λ x i (t, y, p) as the probability of sale for each t, y, p. If we use the entire sample W then M i should be the same fixed value for all sample points. However, using the entire sample may be excessive. In this case we can simulate sample paths for a randomly selected subset of W (with or without replacement) resulting in random but identically distributed M i 's. Let the corresponding sales process histories be denoted as N ij t ij , j = 1, . . . , M i (where t ij represents T or the time after the sale of the Y 's item in this sales process path). Then the expectation in (15) can be approximated by the average over W and the simulated sample paths:
is the total number of sample paths. The second component is an update procedure for a finite-sample approximation W to the distribution x(N t , P t ) that obtains a finite-sample approximation W to the posterior distribution x(N t , P t ), where N t ∩ [0, t − 1] = N t and P t is a sublist of prices in P t up to time t − 1, inclusive. This is done by a Monte-Carlo accept-reject algorithm with bootstrap-like re-sampling of the elements of W (see, for example, Levina (2006) ). The elements of the new sample are denoted as x k , where k is the counter of points in the new sample W .
Algorithm: accept-reject with bootstrap re-sampling
Inputs: finite-sample (size K) approximation W of x(N t , P t ), sales and price process history (N t , P t )
In selecting the new sample W , the algorithm favors those elements of W with a high likelihood ratio.
Online Appendix: proofs of structural results of subsection 2
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof is by reverse induction on t. Suppose that the statement holds for t + 1 and subsequent decision periods. Given the observed price p and budget b, let the expected present value of surplus for the ith customer be V x i (t, y, n, p, b). The subscripts for the future expected values of surplus are not needed due to the symmetry of customers assumed by induction. The expected present value of the customer i surplus at time t + 1 for given y, n before experiencing the price used by the company in step t + 1 (which a consumer anticipates to bep(t + 1)) and before experiencing the budget value B i (t + 1) is
We next describe the customer decision at time t and also show, by induction, that it is symmetric with respect to customers, and the subscript i can be dropped. We let the index of remaining customers run from 1 to n without loss of generality because the budgets are exchangeable. Before we establish symmetry at time t, let customer i decision be denoted as λ x i (t, y, n, p, b). The quantity V x i (t, y, n, p, b) is computed as the expected present value with respect to the budgets B −i (t) of other customers and all possible transitions (sales to one of n remaining customers) in the sales process:
Since the future expected surplus of a customer does not depend on i, and the expectation operator is linear, this expression can be rewritten as
We see that the maximizer (the optimal response) does not depend on i. Therefore, the subscripts for the terms λ x j (t, y, n, p, B j (t)) can be dropped. Moreover, noting the linearity of the objective in λ i , we obtain the relation (4) for the optimal (equilibrium) customer response which is valid for each of the n remaining customers.
We now obtain a recursive relation for S x i (t, y, n, p) and, to conclude our justification of symmetry with respect to customers, show that the subscripts can also be dropped. The value of E B j (t)| B i (t)=b, x [λ x (t, y, n, p, B j (t))]
is independent of subscripts j = i because the budgets are exchangeable. Therefore, the values of V x i (t, y, n, p, b) and S x i (t, y, n, p) = Ep (t),B i (t)|p(t−1)=p,x [V x i (t, y, n,p(t), B i (t))]
are independent of i. Using the fact that
[λ x (t, y, n, p, B j (t))]] = E B j (t)|x [λ x (t, y, n, p, B j (t))], relation (4), and dropping the subscripts we arrive at (1).
Reformulation of (1). In the subsequent analysis, we use the following reformulation of (1):
(17) S x (t, y, n, p) = Ep (t),B(t)|p(t−1)=p,x [s x (t, y, n,p(t), B(t))], where (18) s x (t, y, n, p, b) =λ b − p − βS x (t + 1, y, n, p) + +λ(n−1)I[b ≥ p+βS x (t+1, y, n, p)] βS x (t+1, y −1, n−1, p)−βS x (t+1, y, n, p) +βS x (t+1, y, n, p).
Technical lemma used in the proof of Proposition 2.
Lemma 1. For any t and p, if the inequality S x (t + 1, y − 1, n − 1, p) ≤ S x (t + 1, y, n, p) holds for all y, n then s x (t, y − 1, n − 1, p, b) ≤ s x (t, y, n, p, b) holds for all y, n, b.
Proof. Let y, n be arbitrary and consider the following three cases split according to the possible ranges of b.
Case 1: b < p + βS x (t + 1, y − 1, n − 1, p). Then s x (t, y, n, p, b) − s x (t, y − 1, n − 1, p, b) = βS x (t + 1, y, n, p) − βS x (t + 1, y − 1, n − 1, p) ≥ 0.
Case 2: p + βS x (t + 1, y − 1, n − 1, p) ≤ b < p + βS x (t + 1, y, n, p). Then s x (t, y, n, p, b) − s x (t, y − 1, n − 1, p, b)
= βS x (t + 1, y, n, p) −λ b − p − βS x (t + 1, y − 1, n − 1, p)
−λ(n − 2) βS x (t + 1, y − 2, n − 2, p) − βS x (t + 1, y − 1, n − 1, p) − βS x (t + 1, y − 1, n − 1, p)
where we use b < p + βS x (t + 1, y, n, p) to obtain > βS x (t + 1, y, n, p) −λ βS x (t + 1, y, n, p) − βS x (t + 1, y − 1, n − 1, p) −λ(n − 2) βS x (t + 1, y − 2, n − 2, p) − βS x (t + 1, y − 1, n − 1, p) − βS x (t + 1, y − 1, n − 1, p)
and, rearranging the terms, finally get = (1 −λ) βS x (t + 1, y, n, p) − βS x (t + 1, y − 1, n − 1, p) +λ(n − 2) βS x (t + 1, y − 1, n − 1, p) − βS x (t + 1, y − 2, n − 2, p) ≥ 0.
Case 3: b ≥ p + βS x (t + 1, y, n, p). Then s x (t, y, n, p, b) − s x (t, y − 1, n − 1, p, b)
=λ b − p − βS x (t + 1, y, n, p) +λ(n − 1) βS x (t + 1, y − 1, n − 1, p) − βS x (t + 1, y, n, p) + βS x (t + 1, y, n, p)
−λ(n − 2) βS x (t + 1, y − 2, n − 2, p) − βS x (t + 1, y − 1, n − 1, p) − βS x (t + 1, y − 1, n − 1, p) = (1 −λn) βS x (t + 1, y, n, p) − βS x (t + 1, y − 1, n − 1, p) +λ(n − 2) βS x (t + 1, y − 1, n − 1, p) − βS x (t + 1, y − 2, n − 2, p) ≥ 0.
Proof of Proposition 2. The statement is obtained by inverse induction on t. The basis of induction (at t = T ) is the boundary conditions. Each induction step is an immediate application of Lemma 1 and equation (17) for all y, n, p.
Technical lemma used in the proof of Proposition 3.
Lemma 2. For any t and p, if the inequalities S x (t + 1, y − 1, n − 1, p) ≤ S x (t + 1, y, n, p) and S x (t + 1, y, n, p) ≤ S x (t + 1, y, n − 1, p) hold for all y, n then s x (t, y, n, p, b) ≤ s x (t, y, n − 1, p, b) holds for all y, n, b.
Proof. Let y, n be arbitrary and consider the following three cases.
Case 1: b < p + βS x (t + 1, y, n, p). Then, s x (t, y, n, p, b) − s x (t, y, n − 1, p, b) = βS x (t + 1, y, n, p) − βS x (t + 1, y, n − 1, p) ≤ 0.
Case 4: b ≥ p + βS x (t + 1, y, n, p) and b ≥ p + βS x (t + 1, y, n, p ). Then, s x (t, y, n, p, b) − s x (t, y, n, p , b) =λ b − p − βS x (t + 1, y, n, p) +λ(n − 1) βS x (t + 1, y − 1, n − 1, p) − βS x (t + 1, y, n, p) + βS x (t + 1, y, n, p) −λ b − p − βS x (t + 1, y, n, p ) −λ(n − 1) βS x (t + 1, y − 1, n − 1, p ) − βS x (t + 1, y, n, p ) − βS x (t + 1, y, n, p ) =λ(p − p) +λ(n − 1) βS x (t + 1, y − 1, n − 1, p) − βS x (t + 1, y − 1, n − 1, p ) + (1 −λn) βS x (t + 1, y, n, p) − βS x (t + 1, y, n, p ) ≤λ(p − p) +λ(n − 1)κ t+1 (p − p) + (1 −λn)κ t+1 (p − p) = (λ + (1 −λ)κ t+1 )(p − p).
and (19) follows similarly to Case 3.
Proof of Proposition 4. The statement is obtained by inverse induction on t. The basis for induction (at t = T ) is obtained immediately since S x (T, y, n, p) = S x (T, y, n, p ) = 0 from the boundary conditions. The induction step is based on Lemma 3. Suppose that (8) holds for all y, n, p, p and time instances t + 1, t + 2, . . . , T . From Proposition 2 and the induction hypothesis, it follows that conditions of Lemma 3 are satisfied and the expression κ t p + βs x (t, y, n, p, b) is monotone in p for each y, n. It follows that the expression E B(t) | x [κ t p + βs x (t, y, n, p, B(t))]
is monotone in p for each y, n. Sincep(t) |p(t − 1) = p is stochastically smaller thanp(t) |p(t − 1) = p , we conclude that Ep (t),B(t)|p(t−1)=p,x [κ tp (t) + βs x (t, y, n,p(t), B(t))] ≤ Ep (t),B(t)|p(t−1)=p ,x [κ tp (t) + βs x (t, y, n,p(t), B(t))]
for all y, n, p, p where p > p. Using the equation (17), we can rewrite this relation as βS x (t, y, n, p) − βS x (t, y, n, p ) ≤ κ t (Ep 
